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CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF JEWISH LAW: 
SOME RELIGIOUS REFLECTIONS ON DAVID J. 
BEDERMAN’S CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 
Michael J. Broyde∗ 
Professor David J. Bederman’s seminal work, Custom as a Source of Law,1 
seeks to answer several foundational questions in the fields of legal theory and 
formation. One of the central concerns: Can custom itself be law? That is to 
say, can custom alone become binding as custom, acting in ways that we 
would typically think of as legal, even before it is ever recognized or stamped 
as obligatory by the institutions that we would normally think of as creating 
compulsory law, for example, by word of an authoritative legislative body or 
by way of judicial precedent?2 And, if so, at what point does that pivotal shift 
from “should” to “must” occur? 
While Professor Bederman’s work is, as always, learned, thorough, and 
convincing,3 in addition to elucidating the principles for secular custom as a 
source of law, he has opened the door for us to speculate on the question’s 
applicability to another set of rules and practices, namely, religious laws and 
norms. And so, we ask in this short piece, can and when does minhag 
(customary Jewish practice) become halakha (Jewish law)? 
It is important to define some terms at the outset, seeing that custom acting 
as law in this context will often serve the same purpose as, and be hard to 
distinguish from, regular legislation. Both operate to solve new problems for 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. My deepest thanks to Mark Goldfeder of Emory 
University for his assistance. 
 1 DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW (2010). 
 2 For a discussion of the “[m]andatory [v]iew” of customary international law (CIL), see Curtis A. 
Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 204–05 (2010). Unlike 
treaties, the rules of CIL do not arise from express negotiation, and they do not require any domestic act of 
ratification to become binding. Although these differences might suggest that nations should have greater 
flexibility to withdraw from rules of CIL than from treaties, the conventional wisdom is precisely the opposite. 
According to most international law scholars, a nation may have some ability to opt out of a CIL rule by 
persistent objection to the rule before the time of its formation (although even that proposition is contested), 
but once the rule becomes established, nations that are subject to it never have the right to withdraw 
unilaterally from it. Id. at 204. 
 3 Broadly, he advances the view that strong, objective evidence of communal practice along with a 
subjective calculus of the norm’s inherent value as a legal requirement are the ingredients that make a custom 
binding. 
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which there is no existing law or arise when the existing law requires 
modification, clarification, or reform. As Israeli Supreme Court Justice 
Menachem Elon once put it, “The formal distinction . . . between custom and 
legislation is that legislation operates openly under the direction of an 
authorized body, whereas custom operates anonymously and nondirectedly by 
the agency of the entire people or of some particular segment of the people.”4 
To put it simply, if we wish to study a law or an enactment, we go to the 
legislative authorities or the courts; if we wish to know about a custom, we “go 
and see what the people do.”5 
There is one school of thought in which this Tribute would be a very short 
piece indeed; according to this view, at least from a Jewish law perspective, the 
custom of the people cannot ever directly create de facto law. The fact that the 
public follows a particular practice is considered to be merely sufficient 
evidence to prove the existence of some other once-created, now-forgotten (but 
definitely formal) legal rule. Custom is simply a legislative trust, preserving 
the tradition for later generations even when the original source is lost in time. 
While there are several Talmudic passages that understand custom in this 
manner, perhaps the clearest restatement of that view comes from the post-
Talmudic responsa of R. Yitzchak Alfasi: “The source of any practice 
customarily followed . . . is an enactment . . . and even if in the course of time 
the source of the practice has been forgotten, nevertheless the practice has been 
generally accepted and retains its legal force.”6 
Following that line of thought, Nahmanides writes, “Custom is considered 
to be binding only when the townspeople or the communal leaders specifically 
and formally adopt it, but any custom not so adopted cannot override an 
existing legal rule unless the rule is doubtful.”7 Again, according to this view, 
custom never masquerades as law; it simply teaches us what the original law 
was. 
 
 4 2 MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 881 (Bernard Auerbach & Melvin 
J. Sykes trans., 1994) (1988). 
 5 Id. (quoting BABYLONIAN TALMUD BERACHOT 45a, and BABYLONIAN TALMUD PESACHIM 54a). While 
it is true that rules based on custom are subject to some eventual review by rabbinic authority and are 
sometimes abolished if, for example, they are based on error, see, e.g., TOSAFOT, ERUVIN 101b, are 
unreasonable, see, e.g., JERUSALEM TALMUD PESACHIM 25b, or are “bad” or ignorant customs, see, e.g., 
TOSAFOT, BAVA BASRA 2a, s.v. Ba’gvil Hazeh), the public as a whole, and not the reviewing rabbis, is still 
regarded as the direct creative source of the normative rules that are generated by custom. 
 6 ELON, supra note 4, at 883 (alterations in original) (quoting YITZCHAK ALFASI, TESHUVOT HA-RIF no. 
13). 
 7 Id. at 884 (quoting NAHMANIDES, novellae to BAVA BATRA 144b, s.v. Ha D’Amrinan). 
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The majority of Jewish law authorities, however, do believe that custom 
alone can itself be the source of independent legal authority, at least 
sometimes. The following examples, drawn from the fields of labor law and 
commercial law respectively, will hopefully illustrate the contours and 
limitations of that process. 
Before we continue, it is important to note that Jewish law can be divided 
into two main areas of law: civil law (encompassing all of the fields that we 
tend to think of as part of any legal system) and ritual religious law, with 
family law somewhere in between. While we will attempt to test the strength 
and bounds of custom in the area of civil law, there are some inherent 
distinctions between “regular” legislation and customary law in regard to ritual 
religious law, where the scope and power of custom is by nature more limited. 
Generally speaking, in questions of ritual law, custom may not permit that 
which the law indisputably forbids. Still, even in that circumscribed area, 
custom may prohibit what has been permitted, and sanctions may sometimes 
be applied against those who transgress the customary rules.8 
Custom in Jewish law can be said to perform three main functions, which 
operate with increasing levels of power. At the weakest level, custom 
determines which view is to be normatively accepted when there is a legitimate 
Jewish law disagreement. On a slightly stronger plane, it can supplement 
existing law when new questions or situations arise that preexisting norms are 
unable to address. At its strongest, it can creatively establish new rules that 
may even be contrary to existing laws or norms. It is this third category that 
separates the power of custom in civil law—with its creative force for 
change—from its weaker ritual counterpart. 
Custom in civil Jewish law derives its power as a simple extension of the 
freedom of contract. Jewish civil law is to be seen as the default state, like 
much of the Uniform Commercial Code, and in general, it is binding only 
when the parties have not otherwise agreed. In monetary matters, a party is free 
to contract out of any law, even one explicit in the Bible, such as the laws of 
bailments.9 Just as the parties to a transaction can agree in advance to modify 
the rules to fit their particular needs, when the community as a whole acts 
 
 8 See JERUSALEM TALMUD PESACHIM 26a. 
 9 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD BAVA METZIA 94a; TOSEFTA KIDDUSHIN 3:7–8. 
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through custom, it is as if they had all agreed in advance to change or modify 
the given rules in a particular situation.10 
A quick look at the Mishna in the seventh chapter of Tractate Bava Metzia 
will illustrate this principle. The Mishna states, “One who engages laborers and 
instructs them to arise early and retire late may not compel them to do so 
where the custom is not to begin early and work late.”11 
The Talmud explains that, under biblical law, work was to begin early and 
end late,12 but as R. Hoshaya notes, “This tells us that custom overrides the 
law.”13 Not only does custom change the rule in this specific instance, but also, 
upon closer examination, custom here is overruling one of the most basic rules 
of general Jewish jurisprudence, namely, the idea that one who seeks to obtain 
something that is in another’s possession bears the burden of proving his 
entitlement. As the Talmud continues, and as R. Immi stated, “The burden of 
proof is on the claimant, except in this case,”14 for example, the employer may 
not say to the laborer, “If you want to take more money for working less time 
than you would be entitled to under the law, the burden is on you to prove that 
your hours should follow the custom when the standard we were using was not 
immediately apparent or explicitly stipulated.” Rather, the custom supplants 
the law as the norm, and the burden of proof therefore shifts to the employer to 
prove that the hours should not follow custom if he wishes to detract from the 
wages that the worker is customarily entitled to. This is true regardless of the 
employer’s own subjective intent when doing the hiring. 
Custom’s defining imprint on commercial Jewish law throughout the ages, 
however, is most apparent in the field of transactions. As a general rule, Jewish 
law prescribes very fixed and formal techniques for the transfer of ownership 
and the creation of binding reciprocal obligations between a buyer and a seller 
 
 10 See ELON, supra note 4, at 904 n.29 (quoting SHMUEL DE MEDINA, TESHUVOT MAHARASHDAM no. 
380). (“Every monetary transaction may be effective on either of two bases: (1) the rules clearly set forth in 
our holy Torah, or enacted by the Sages in the Talmud, or (2) any stipulation agreed to by the parties. This is 
why the modes of acquisition practiced by merchants are effective although they are neither written in the 
Torah nor in accord with the strict law. When merchants follow a particular custom, it is as if all have agreed 
with one another that a transaction so entered into shall be effective, and transactions are entered into with that 
understanding.”). 
 11 BABYLONIAN TALMUD BAVA METZIA 7. 
 12 Based on the Bible, “The sun ariseth, they gather themselves together, and lay them down in their 
dens. Man goeth forth unto his work and to his labour until the evening.” Psalms 104:22–23 (King James). 
 13 JERUSALEM TALMUD BAVA METZIA 27b. 
 14 Id. 50a. 
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(for example, pulling or lifting a purchased article of personal property),15 
methods that were definitely inconvenient and often at variance with the 
evolving needs of the business place and the demand for flexibility in modern 
commercial life. The source for the causative capability and the binding nature 
of custom in mercantile practice (minhag socharim) is the Talmud in Bava 
Metzia: 
R. Papi said in the name of Rava: “Affixing the sitomta (seal) is a 
mode of acquisition.” To what extent is it effective? R. Haviva said: 
“It signifies complete transfer of ownership.” The Rabbis said: “It 
merely subjects one [who afterward does not follow through on the 
agreement] to the imprecation ‘He who punished . . . .’” The law is 
that it merely subjects one to the imprecation. . . . However in places 
where it is the custom that it transfers ownership, it is effective to do 
so.16 
The distinctions that we have been embracing thus far, between (1) law, (2) 
custom, and (3) custom functioning as law, are all clearly defined in this 
discussion. First, according to R. Haviva, affixing the sitomta creates a legal 
obligation, just like any other mode of acquisition. Second, according to the 
rabbis, the act creates a moral and religious obligation for the buyer to follow 
through, such that one who does not keep it may be cursed, but one that is not, 
at the end of the day, legally enforceable. Third, the law in fact follows the 
rabbis, and yet in places where the sitomta is customarily acceptable as a 
legitimate mode of transfer, it does in fact accomplish the transfer to the same 
extent as any other legal mode of acquisition and is thus enforceable. 
But that is not the end of the sitomta’s innovative influence on Jewish 
commercial law. While there are those that disagree,17 according to several 
prominent early Talmudic commentators,18 a sitomta mechanism (i.e., a 
culturally customary mode of transaction) is not only able to function as an 
 
 15 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD KIDDUSHIN 1:5; RITVA, BABYLONIAN TALMUD KIDDUSHIN 25b. 
 16 BABYLONIAN TALMUD BAVA METZIA 74a; accord id. 44a (“He who punished the generations of the 
Flood and of the Dispersion will exact payment from one who does not stand by his word.”). A sitomta is the 
seal that a shopkeeper makes on a barrel of wine to signify that it is his. Oftentimes shopkeepers would buy 
wine wholesale and in bulk; they would then leave the barrels stored in the seller’s warehouse until such time 
as they were needed and would mark them with their seal to indicate which barrels had already been bought. 
 17 See MORDECHAI, BABYLONIAN TALMUD SHABBAT 472. A similar approach can be found in TESHUVOT 
RADBAZ 1:278, and is accepted as correct by ARYEH LEIB HA-KOHEN HELLER, KITZOT HA-HOSHEN ON 
SHULHAN ARUKH, HOSHEN MISHPAT 201:1. 
 18 See, e.g., TESHUVOT HA-ROSH 13:20; MORDECHAI, BABYLONIAN TALMUD SHABBAT 472 (quoting 
Maharam Me’Rutenberg); see also JACOB LORBERBAUM, NETIVOT HA-MISHPAT, BIURIM ON SHULHAN 
ARUKH, HOSHEN MISHPAT 201:1 (appearing to agree). 
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equivalent to the classic legal methods, it can be even be effective to 
accomplish tasks that cannot normally be transacted at all according to Jewish 
law.19 For example, halakha has no native mechanism for transferring 
ownership of an item that does not now exist in the world, or for the transfer of 
items to someone who does not yet exist. According to this approach, however, 
if the common commercial practice of a particular society included a procedure 
for such transfers, Jewish law in that locale would incorporate the practice as 
both valid and (customarily) enforceable. The sitomta then is indeed an 
instance where custom is even stronger (or at least more widely effective) than 
the law itself. Thus, the Rashba writes: “Great is the power of the community, 
which triumphs even without a kinyan . . . . Even something which is not yet in 
existence can be sold to someone who does not yet exist [if community 
practice so provides].”20 
The principle behind the sitomta ruling paved the way for all kinds of 
developments in Jewish commercial law, leading the Rashba to note, “From 
this [the sitomta rule] we learn that custom overrides the law in all similar 
situations [and] that custom determines the validity of acquisitions and 
transfers in all matters of civil law; therefore merchants may acquire anything 
in any matter that conforms to their usual practice.”21 
The principle also led the Shulchan Aruch to codify as follows: “The same 
applies to any mercantile practice engaged in as a mode of acquisition, such as 
a buyer’s giving a coin to the seller, or a handshake by the parties . . . or . . . the 
delivery of the key to the buyer . . . all are similar acts.”22 
The underlying Jewish law flexibility in the development of binding 
customs within communities and even within specific trades23 has been 
 
 19 See Michael J. Broyde & Steven H. Resincoff, Jewish Law and Modern Business Structures: The 
Corporate Paradigm, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1685, 1767 (1997). 
 20 TESHUVOT HA-RASHBA 1:546. Kinyan is the formal transfer method mandated by Jewish law. 
 21 CHIDDUSHEI HA-RASHBA, s.v. Meshalem Lei (discussing BABYLONIAN TALMUD BAVA METZIA 74a). 
An excellent example of a modern-day remnant of the binding nature of customary modes of transaction in 
Jewish law can be seen in the Hasidically dominated Diamond District of New York City. The Diamond 
Dealers Club on Forty-Seventh Street, the central marker for diamond trading in the United States, conducts its 
mandatory arbitration proceedings under the rules of Talmudic law. Throughout the diamond-dealing industry, 
Jews and gentiles alike conduct their business using rules that have been around for generations and that are 
based on honesty and trust with no written contracts. Section 1 of the trade rules of the DDC bylaws states, 
“Any oral offer is binding among dealers, when agreement is expressed by the accepted words ‘Mazel and 
Broche’ or any other words expressing the words of accord.” DIAMOND DEALERS CLUB BYLAWS art. 18, § 1 
(1980). 
 22 SHULCHAN ARUCH, CHOSHEN MISHPAT 201:1–2. 
 23 For example, see BABYLONIAN TALMUD BAVA KAMMA 116b.  
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invaluable in allowing Jewish merchants across time and space to conduct their 
business using the mechanisms of the places they have found themselves in. 
Because common usage matters, secular customs are generally considered 
valid and may even be incorporated into Jewish law (provided that the 
practices stipulated are not otherwise prohibited by halakha).24 While there is a 
halachik question as to whether the creative power of custom is enough to 
finalize a transaction solely by oral agreement (in contrast to the clear 
Talmudic statement to the contrary,25 accepted by the Shulchan Aruch26), 
following the ruling of the Radbaz,27 most subsequent halachik authorities 
have ruled that even that case is no different than the sitomta. Some authorities 
also limit the new modes of acquisition to transactions involving personal, as 
opposed to real, property,28 but most have held that there is no such 
distinction.29 Thus, in the modern State of Israel, rabbinic courts recognize the 
transfer of ownership of land by registration in the land registry or by contract 
as a mode of acquisition valid under Jewish law by virtue of custom.30 
Having established that customs can quite often become their own form of 
quasi-Jewish law, we are left with one final question: When and why does this 
sometimes happen? Or, in the immortal words of David Bederman, “What 
defines that extra, subjective ingredient” that makes certain customs act like 
law?31 
Bederman is left to confess that there is not one unified theory that can 
account for custom as a source of law in all different traditions. Roman law, 
for example, tended to emphasize the consent of the relevant community 
embracing the practice, while canon law introduced a naturalist vision of the 
reasonability and necessity of the usage. English common law espoused the 
“artificial reason” of judges in assessing the value of customs that met certain 
minimum standards, while at the same time speaking in an almost Austinian 
idiom of the compulsion of those who follow them.32 
 
 24 See Michael J. Broyde, A Jewish Law View of World Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 79, 86 (2005). 
 25 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD BAVA METZIA 48a (“[O]ral agreements do not affect a transfer of 
ownership.”). 
 26 SHULCHAN ARUCH, CHOSHEN MISHPAT 189:1. This is true even if there are witnesses to the 
transaction. 
 27 TESHUVOT RADBAZ 1:278. 
 28 See BAYIT CHADASH TO TUR, CHOSHEN MISHPAT 201:2. 
 29 E.g., SHULCHAN ARUCH, CHOSHEN MISHPAT 201:6. 
 30 See, e.g., Kraka Ltd. v. Assaf Rothenburg & Partners, 4 PDR 75, 81 (Isr.). 
 31 BEDERMAN, supra note 1, at 173. 
 32 Id. 
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Jewish law can lay claim to all of these reasons and one more approach at 
justification that the others have not attempted. For a custom to be binding, it 
must be commonly accepted. As Maimonides writes, “In all these and similar 
matters, the custom of the country is a fundamental consideration and must be 
followed, provided that the custom has spread throughout the country.”33 It 
also needs to have been clearly accepted and consented to by the people: “It 
must be known that the custom is established and widespread, and that the 
townspeople have followed it at least three times, because the people often 
make ad hoc responses to some particular need without intending thereby to 
establish any general custom.”34 
Customs must be prima facie reasonable under normative Jewish law,35 
may arise out of necessity, and are sometimes subject to authoritative 
assessment and judicial review. But according to at least one school of thought 
in Jewish law, the real reason that minhag is binding as a source of halakha is 
because customary practices are, in fact, somewhat divine in nature. 
The Talmud tells us that when Hillel the Elder was asked a question 
regarding the bringing of the paschal sacrifice on the Sabbath, he answered, “I 
have heard this law but I forgot it.”36 He then assured the anxious priests that 
they did not have to worry; they could simply rely on the custom and follow 
whatever actions the people normally took: “However leave it to [the people 
of] Israel; if they are not prophets, they are the descendants of prophets.”37 In 
the version in the Tosefta, the reading of divine interplay in the formation of 
customary practices is even clearer. Hillel explicitly says, “Leave them alone, 
they are inspired with the heavenly spirit. If they are not prophets, they are the 
descendants of prophets.”38 
Regardless of why custom can be binding as a source of law—whether it is 
simply an outgrowth of necessity, practicality, and consent, or whether it 
hearkens back to earlier forgotten legalities, or even if custom acts as a 
somewhat watered down bridge between Heaven and Earth, expressing and 
reflecting God’s ultimate will in how the practice of the people should look—it 
is clear that custom as a source of law is a topic worthy of the weighty analysis 
 
 33 ELON, supra note 4, at 928 (quoting MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, ISHUT 23:12). 
 34 Id. (quoting TERUMAT HA-DESHEN no. 342). 
 35 See MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, SHEVITAT ASOR 3:3. 
 36 ELON, supra note 4, at 901. 
 37 BABYLONIAN TALMUD PESACHIM 66a. 
 38 ELON, supra note 4, at 902 n.18 (emphasis added) (quoting TOSEFTA PESACHIM 4:14). 
BROYDE GALLEYS4 7/17/2012  8:37 AM 
2012] CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF JEWISH LAW 1045 
and deep consideration that David J. Bederman has given it. For this, and for 
all his other work, we remain extremely grateful. 
There is an ancient rabbinic tradition that scholars, even after their death, 
are always referred to in the present tense and never in the past tense. Thus, we 
say “Maimonides says,” rather than “Maimonides said,” even though 
Maimonides died in 1204. The classical explanation is that scholars live on 
through their works and words. Although David J. Bederman died on Sunday, 
December 4, 2011, he lives on as a scholar. His words and works will never 
die. 
